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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court poured this matter 
over to this Court on May 23,2007. The Utah Supreme Court initially had jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants ("Eaglebrook") state the issues and standards of 
review for the first time, as the Appellant and Cross-Appellee ("PacifiCorp") failed to file 
a brief in this matter. 
Issue I: The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding Attorney Fees 
to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Standards of Review: Whether PacifiCorp's claims and defenses lacked merit is a 
question of law, requiring no deference to the trial court. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202,204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Whether PacifiCorp acted in bad faith is a question of fact reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. Whether the non-award of attorneys' fees to 
Eaglebrook was reasonable will be considered under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). Eaglebrook preserved this issue in 
its Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. at 250, and in oral argument on the motion. 
Issue II: Eaglebrook Should Receive Their Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
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Standard of Review: None. The appellate court shall award just damages for a 
frivolous appeal. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in 
bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b). Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The main issue of this lawsuit is simple, to wit: Where does PacifiCorp's access 
easement to its Winchester Hills Substation exist. Unfortunately, this lawsuit became 
complicated because it was improperly formed by PacifiCorp from the beginning. The 
lawsuit was improperly formed as a result of PacifiCorp's failure to serve Eaglebrook with 
the initiating Complaint and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and became more 
convoluted as PacifiCorp attempted to prosecute the case to cover up obvious procedural 
errors. 
In its first pleading, Eaglebrook raised the issue that PacifiCorp failed to timely serve 
Eaglebrook with the Summons, Complaint or a copy of the Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. PacifiCorp acknowledged it never served Eaglebrook with process. Despite 
PacifiCorp's awareness and admission of failing to serve Eaglebrook, PacifiCorp, in bad 
faith, continued to litigate the matter. 
As a result of PacifiCorp's tactics, Eaglebrook was entirely without ability to properly 
or adequately defend this matter. The trial court judge who handled this case recognized the 
improper formation of this case and dismissed the action. 
Further, the trial court found that PacifiCorp persisted in advancing an improperly 
formed case against good reason and caused Eaglebrook to defend in a void of pleadings and 
proper procedure, and, as a result, the court found that an award of attorney fees and costs 
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was proper. However, without explanation, the court only awarded minimal costs. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
PacifiCorp commenced this action by filing the Complaint and a Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction on April 1, 2005. On April 15, 
2005, the trial court heard PacifiCorp's arguments and reviewed the pleadings in support of 
a preliminary injunction, all in the absence of service of process upon Eaglebrook. 
Additionally, Eaglebrook was not aware of the suit and could not make an appearance. 
Notwithstanding the lack of notice, or absence of Eaglebrook at the hearing on the 
preliminary injunction, on April 25, 2005, an Order was issued, granting the preliminary 
injunction. 
By rule, PacifiCorp had until July 31, 2005 to serve Eaglebrook with the complaint 
and summons, but it was not until August 9, 2005, that Eaglebrook even became aware of 
the possibility of legal proceedings when R.C. Tolman was handed an Order for Preliminary 
Injunction by a Washington County Sheriff. At that time, Mr. Tolman did not receive a copy 
of the Complaint, nor a copy of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. He only received an 
order out of the blue sky. 
As Eaglebrook was now subject to an improper order, Mr. Tolman retained counsel 
to have the Injunction removed. On February 24, 2006, Eaglebrook petitioned the court to 
set aside the Preliminary Injunction. Through its petition, Eaglebrook raised the issue that 
process had not been served by PacifiCorp and the Injunction should be removed. 
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On March 6, 2006, PacifiCorp stipulated to set aside the Preliminary Injunction and 
requested a hearing. To Eaglebrook, it was entirely unclear why a hearing was necessary. 
Despite a lack of service and a moot issue relating to the Preliminary Injunction, on April 3, 
2006, a hearing to have the preliminary injunction set aside was scheduled by the court for 
April 27, 2006. Between April 3, 2006 and April 27, 2006, no service of the Summons or 
Complain, nor for that matter the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was made by the 
Plaintiff upon the Defendant. At the hearing, the court began a hearing on the Preliminary 
Injunction, but the short time scheduled by the court would not permit a full evidentiary 
hearing and the hearing was continued. The parties agreed to certain conditions which would 
allow the status quo to continue in terms of access to the sub-station. A request by the 
Plaintiff for proper service of both the Complaint and Motion was made at that time in the 
court's chambers to properly form the case. 
The next hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was scheduled for June 26, 
2006. On June 14, 2006, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing on PacifiCorp's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction to July 26,2006. The Complaint and Motion still remained 
undelivered despite multiple requests. 
On July 18, 2006, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing again. This time the 
hearing was continued to September 25,2006. As PacifiCorp remained non-compliant with 
the requests that service be effectuated, Eaglebrook had not choice but to push the issue of 
service. Either PacifiCorp had to prove to the court that effective service was rendered or the 
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matter should be dismissed. 
On August 29,2006, Eaglebrook filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and asked for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Motion asserted that PacifiCorp had failed to prove 
service within 120 days of the filing of its Complaint and continued to prosecute the action 
under improper circumstances. PacifiCorp objected. Eaglebrook replied to the objection. On 
November 11, 2006, the District Court dismissed PacifiCorp's claims because the trial court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Eaglebrook. PacifiCorp failed to appear at that hearing. 
Eaglebrook's counsel informed PacifiCorp's counsel of the court's ruling and gave opposing 
counsel the opportunity to object to the ruling in light of PacifiCorp's failure to appear at a 
properly noticed hearing. 
On December 12, 2006, PacifiCorp filed an Objection to the Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. PacifiCorp asserted it did not have an opportunity to be 
heard at the November 11, 2006 hearing because of miscommunications. 
Taking a second bite at the apple, PacifiCorp also asserted that a dismissal should not 
be entered because Eaglebrook waived their opportunity to object to service and personal 
jurisdiction by presenting arguments on the merits in the case and by stipulating to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
On December 14, 2006, PacifiCorp requested a hearing on its Objections to 
Defendants' Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. PacifiCorp, in an abundance of 
caution, also filed a new civil action raising the same issues in another, new case. 
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On December 26, 2006, Eaglebrook filed an affidavit of counsel in support of the 
request for fees and costs made within the Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing on 
PacifiCorp's Objections was held on February 12, 2007. On that date, the court heard full 
arguments from both sides and considered all of the pleadings of the parties on the issue of 
Summary Judgment. 
On March 22, 2007, the trial court entered its final Order on the Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and dismissed PacifiCorp's action, without prejudice. In the final 
Order, an award of attorney's fees and costs was found to be proper. Without explanation, 
the trial court only awarded costs in the amount of $427.97. 
PacifiCorp filed its notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah on April 30, 2007. 
Eaglebrook filed its notice of cross appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah on May 10, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
PacifiCorp's Improperly Formed Action 
If it did not already know beforehand, PacifiCorp should have become aware of its 
failure to serve Eaglebrook with the Summons and Complaint and the Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction when Eaglebrook filed its Petition to Set Aside the Preliminary Injunction. R. at 
45-47. In the stipulation to dismiss the Preliminary Injunction, PacifiCorp's counsel stated 
that "unbeknownst to counsel, the Complaint had not been served upon the defendants prior 
to the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction." R. at 69. Also, PacifiCorp 
"conceded that service hadn't been made and that the defendants didn't have notice and 
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opportunity to be heard." R. at 307. However, PacifiCorp "did not stipulate to the dismissal 
of this action." R. at 307. 
As the time for service had already passed, and PacifiCorp knew it could not prove 
service, PacifiCorp should have dismissed the instant matter and filed an new civil case as 
the present matter was terminally flawed. It did not take this logical course of action. Instead, 
PacifiCorp continued to litigate under the flawed case number. 
PacifiCorp attempted to argue in defense of its actions that Eaglebrook submitted 
itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by participating in the matter "regarding the merits 
of the case" and thereby "waived any right they may have had to challenge the jurisdiction 
of this Court." R. at 152. 
Responding to the fact that Eaglebrook had not made an appearance within 120 days 
of the filing of the Complaint, the court stated in its final Order that an award of attorney fees 
and costs was proper because of PacifiCorp's persistence in advancing an improperly formed 
case against good reason. R. at 280. 
PacifiCorp's Bad Faith 
In dismissing the case, the trial court found that an award of attorney fees and costs 
was proper because of the way PacifiCorp pursued its action. R. at 280. 
From its initial pleading, Eaglebrook raised the issue of PacifiCorp's failure to serve 
Eaglebrook. R. at 45-47. PacifiCorp admitted its lapse. R. at 69. PacifiCorp's counsel also 
admitted, "We weren't even aware that the defendants had not been served until after the 
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expiration of the 120 days." R. at 307. 
Notwithstanding its knowledge, PacifiCorp persisted in litigating under the instant 
case number. In defense, Eaglebrook was justified in taking the necessary steps to ferret out 
the issues relating to service and to defend against the improperly formed case and an invalid 
Preliminary Injunction that did impact Eaglebrook's property rights until such time that the 
trial court could dismiss the action. R. at 280. 
From the outset, PacifiCorp only made the case more complicated by its aggressive 
litigation stance and refusal to follow a common sense approach of refiling the case. In its 
final Order, the trial court noted that PacifiCorp improperly obtained the Preliminary 
Injunction Order, "which at that time had the color of law and was obtained under improper 
circumstances." R. at 279. Clearly, PacifiCorp's bad faith was shown by its improper and 
prideful persistence in pursuing a course of action having no foundation in law, e.g., that a 
case improperly formed can somehow be cured through more litigation and legal trickery. 
In contrast, Eaglebrook made every attempt to allow PacifiCorp the opportunity to 
prove service and to provide pleadings to Eaglebrook to properly advance the case -
assuming service was actually made. When requested, Eaglebrook continued hearings and 
even gave PacifiCorp an opportunity to object to a hearing on a dispositive motion it had 
failed to attend. R. at 107, 112, and 305. Eaglebrook even stipulated to the status quo of 
access for PacifiCorp's maintenance vehicles as the parties sorted out the issues of service 
and the underlying factual circumstances relating to the core dispute. R. at Reporter's 
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Transcript of Aprii 27, 2006 hearing, p. 48. 
In its final Order, the trial court found that PacifiCorp should have withdrawn its 
improperly formed action and simply filed a new action at the initial phases of this case after 
learning of its failure to properly and timely serve the Summons and Complaint. R. at 280. 
As a result of PacifiCorp's persistence in advancing an improperly formed case, the trial 
court found that an award of attorney fees and costs was proper. Id. 
The Trial Court's Non-Award of Attorney Fees 
Even though the trial court found that an award of attorney fees and costs was proper, 
court simply did not award any attorney fees to Eaglebrook. R. at 280-281. The trial court did 
not explain its reasoning or give any indication for why it did not award any attorney fees. 
R. at 277-282. Notwithstanding its request for fees and costs, and notwithstanding the trial 
court's willingness and indication that it would review and rule with respect to attorney fees, 
the trial court simply did not award any attorney fees. See R. at 281. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding Attorney Fees 
to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-56. 
A, The trial court properly found that PacifiCorp persisted in advancing an 
improperly formed case against good reason and unnecessarily used the court's time and 
caused Eaglebrook to defend in a void of pleadings and proper procedure. PacifiCorp became 
aware of its failure to properly serve process through Eaglebrook's first pleading. Therefore, 
10 
PacifiCorp's action was wholly without merit once it knew it had failed to serve Eaglebrook 
with process. 
B. PacifiCorp's bad faith in driving up legal costs of the Plaintiff was shown by 
first improperly obtaining the Preliminary Injunction without serving process, and then 
persisting in the action knowing it had failed to serve process on Eaglebrook. PacifiCorp 
must have known it did not serve process on Eaglebrook when it obtained the Preliminary 
Injunction. Even if it did not know then, PacifiCorp became aware of its failure when 
Eaglebrook filed its first pleading. From its initial pleading, Eaglebrook raised the fact that 
PacifiCorp had failed to serve Eaglebrook with process and that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the case. PacifiCorp persisted in asserting a cause of action that was without merit. 
As a result of PacifiCorp's bad faith persistence, Eaglebrook was forced to defend itself to 
the best of their ability until the trial court dismissed PacifiCorp's action, without prejudice. 
C. The trial court's non-award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. The 
court found that PacifiCorp persisted in advancing an improperly formed case "against good 
reason" and that an award of attorney fees and costs was proper. An award of attorney fees 
would have only been "proper" if the action was meritless and not asserted in good faith, 
because Eaglebrook was not seeking attorney's fees under a theory of contract. Eaglebrook 
sought attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Eaglebrook prevailed in the action in obtaining a dismissal without prejudice. 
Therefore, Eaglebrook was entitled to the full amount of those attorney fees unnecessarily 
11 
expended as a result of PacifiCorp's meritless action and bad faith pursuit of that action. 
Eaglebrook provided the trial court with adequate evidence from which to determine the 
amount and reasonableness of those fees. PacifiCorp raised no specific objections to any fees 
or costs and should not be allowed to raise those objections for the first time on appeal. 
Issue II: Eaglebrook Should Receive their Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
The appellate court shall award just damages for PacifiCorp's frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding Attorney Fees 
to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, Eaglebrook was entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
A party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
if a court finds the following: (1) the action lacks merit; and (2) the action was not asserted 
in good faith. Watkiss & Campbell, 808 P.2d 1061,1068 (Utah 1991); Cadyv. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 956 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Where the prevailing party proves both elements, a trial court "has no discretion 
and must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Watkiss, 808 P.2d at 1068. 
The determination of whether a claim or defense lacks merit is a question of law. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). On the other hand, "[a] finding of bad faith 
is a question of fact and is reviewed by this court under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." Id. 
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Moreover, "the trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable 
fee, and [appellate courts] should consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion 
standard." Dixie State Bank v Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
A, PacifiCorp's Action Was Meritless 
PacifiCorp's action was meritless. Whether a claim or defense lacks merit is a 
question of law. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). A claim lacks 
merit when it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact." 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). Here, the trial court found that PacifiCorp 
persisted in advancing an "improperly formed case against good reason" and unnecessarily 
used the court's time and caused Eaglebrook to defend in a void of pleadings and proper 
procedure. R. at 280-281. Such a finding is the equivalent of concluding that PacifiCorp's 
action was meritless. 
If PacifiCorp did not already know, PacifiCorp became aware of its failure to serve 
Eaglebrook with the Summons and Complaint when Eaglebrook filed its Petition to Set 
Aside the Preliminary Injunction. R. at 45-47. After this, Eaglebrook and PacifiCorp entered 
into a stipulation to set aside the preliminary injunction and to request a hearing on the 
matter, wherein PacifiCorp's counsel stated that "the stipulation is based upon the fact that, 
unbeknownst to counsel, the Complaint had not been served upon the defendants prior to the 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction." R. at 69. PacifiCorp's counsel 
"conceded that service hadn't been made and that the defendants didn't have notice and 
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opportunity to be heard." R. at 307. However, at that time, PacifiCorp "did not stipulate to 
the dismissal of this action." R. at 307. 
Despite knowing it failed to serve Eaglebrook with process, PacifiCorp persisted in 
advancing its improperly formed case against Eaglebrook. PacifiCorp argued that Eaglebrook 
had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by participating in the matter 
"regarding the merits of the case" and thereby "waived any right they may have had to 
challenge the jurisdiction of this Court." R. at 152. However, there is no basis in law or fact 
for such an argument with respect to failing to serve process on Eaglebrook, at least, not 
when Eaglebrook properly preserved the issue in its first pleading and never stopped raising 
its objection to the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Eaglebrook. Eaglebrook could 
not sit back and let PacifiCorp impair Eaglebrook's rights. Out of necessity, Eaglebrook was 
forced to unwind what was done by PacifiCorp. Eaglebrook had to enter the fray until the 
trial court properly dismissed the action without prejudice to PacifiCorp. 
Notwithstanding PacifiCorp's waiver arguments, Eaglebrook never waived their right 
to service of process, even though Eaglebrook did raise other issues along with their 
objection to the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. Again, out of necessity, Eaglebrook 
came before the trial court and raised the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction in its very first 
pleading, and, at the same time, Eaglebrook was forced to try and unwind what PacifiCorp 
had done. In other words, Eaglebrook was forced to defend themselves until the trial court 
properly dismissed the action. 
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During the continuances in this case, Eaglebrook continued to ask for proof of timely 
service and for service of the Summons and Complaint. R. at passim. Defendant's belief was 
that service may have been conducted by the Plaintiff upon the resident agent or other officer 
or even a state agency without the knowledge of the principal of Eaglebrook, e.g., Plaintiff 
may have made service to another officer or person acceptable under the rules. However, 
PacifiCorp never proved service of a summons and complaint upon Eaglebrook or any other 
acceptable party-ever. Even to this day, no such proof has been established. 
In short, though service was not made upon Eaglebrook, the possibility existed that 
Plaintiff could have served another acceptable person or even the state of Utah on 
Eaglebrook's behalf. Before filing a dispositive motion, Eaglebrook needed to know, in good 
faith, if any such alternative service was made and PacifiCorp. This reasonable approach 
certainly justifies Eaglebrook's work in the interim before seeking dismissal. Eaglebrook 
only moved the court for dismissal after it was painfully obvious that PacifiCorp could not 
prove timely service and was only postponing the inevitable. 
With respect to presenting and preserving defenses and objections, Rule 12(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection." (emphasis added). With 
respect to waiver of defenses, Rule 12(h) states, "A party waives all defenses and objections 
not presented either by motion or by answer or reply . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). 
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In essence, PacifiCorp argued that Eaglebrook waived service of process by joining 
other defenses and issues with the personal jurisdiction issue. In light of PacifiCorp's 
arguments, it is instructive to note what the Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 725, n. 17 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) court said with respect to waiving personal jurisdiction by a "general 
appearance": 
The doctrines of "general" and "special" appearance, relied on by the court, are 
associated with personal jurisdiction only. Prior to the adoption of Rule 12(b) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party was required to allege lack of personal 
jurisdiction and other jurisdictional defects separately from other 
nonjurisdictional defenses. "[I]f a challenge of this type was joined with any 
nonjurisdictional defenses, the appearance became 'general' and the party's 
right to object to jurisdiction was deemed waived." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1362 (1969). Today the distinction between 
general and special appearances has been effectively abolished by Rule 12(b), 
which permits jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses to be joined. See 
generally id. at § 1344. See also Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes 
Corp., 547 P.2d 206, 207 (Utah 1976) (defendant has not made a general 
appearance by making a motion to release attachment). 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, prior to the adoption of Rule 12(b), Eaglebrook may have 
waived its right to object to jurisdiction by joining other "nonjurisdictional" defenses with 
its initial pleading. However, today, Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
permits jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses to be joined by a party without that party 
incurring a waiver of the right to object to jurisdiction. 
In this case, Eaglebrook raised the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction in its first and 
subsequent pleadings and at the hearings in this case. R. at passim. Eaglebrook based its 
objection to jurisdiction on Rule4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)( 1), the summons together with a copy 
of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after thefding of the 
complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause 
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall 
be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's 
own initiative. 
(emphasis added). In this case, Eaglebrook was not served within 120 days after the filing 
of the complaint; no request for an extension to serve was ever filed; no good cause for not 
serving the summons and complaint within the 120 days was ever demonstrated; and 
Eaglebrook did not waive service of process. Even more importantly, Eaglebrook never made 
a general appearance, nor did it argue any substantive matters within this same time period. 
Therefore, the action "shall be dismissed" if the summons and complaint are not timely 
served. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(i). If the action is dismissed under Rule 4(b)(i), then such 
dismissal is without prejudice. Id. 
The trial court found that PacifiCorp failed to serve the summons and complaint 
within 120 days of its filing of the Complaint and that Eaglebrook did not waive service of 
process, and therefore, the trial court found that PacifiCorp's complaint must be dismissed 
without prejudice. R. at 279-280. The trial court also found that the language of Rule 4(b)(1) 
"is mandatory and requires dismissal of any actions not timely served, and that such a 
dismissal is without prejudice to [PacifiCorp]." R. at 278. 
In its final Order, the trial court found the following with respect to PacifiCorp's 
persistence in advancing its action despite its failure to serve Eaglebrook with the Complaint: 
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This Court finds that as [PacifiCorp] did not take the simple step of 
withdrawing this case, but persisted in advancing an improperly formed case 
against good reason, and as [PacifiCorp] has unnecessarily used the Court's 
time and caused [Eaglebrook] to defend in a void of pleadings and proper 
procedure, an award of attorney fees and costs is proper. 
R. at 280. In essence, what the trial court found is that PacifiCorp's action was meritless 
once PacifiCorp knew of its failure to serve Eaglebrook with process. 
Because of its knowing failure to timely serve process on Eaglebrook, PacifiCorp's 
action was wholly without merit. 
B, PacifiCorp's Bad Faith Was Evident from its Actions and Inaction 
Prior to and During the Lawsuit 
PacifiCorp's bad faith in the instant case is well-documented and the court seems to 
support that finding in its ruling and award of costs. Whether PacifiCorp's actions or inaction 
amounted to bad faith is a question of fact, and the trial court's findings must be upheld 
unless "clearly erroneous." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
PacifiCorp's duty on appeal is to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight ofthe evidence, thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Ohline 
Corp. V. Granite Mill 849 P.2d 602,604 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citing Saunders v. Sharp, 806 
P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). Absent such marshaling, the court must presume the correctness 
of the trial court's findings. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1360 (Utah 
1996). PacifiCorp has not filed a brief, but does have an opportunity to respond to 
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Eaglebrook's brief and there marshall the evidence to attempt to show that the trial court's 
findings are "clearly erroneous." 
Moreover, in this case, the trial court's finding that PacifiCorp persisted in advancing 
an improperly formed case against good reason and unnecessarily used the Court's time and 
caused Eaglebrook to defend in a void of pleadings and proper procedure, R. at 280, is 
equivalent to finding that PacifiCorp's bad faith was amply supported by the record. 
PacifiCorp's bad faith was shown by its actions and inaction by obtaining the 
Preliminary Injunction without giving Eaglebrook notice and an opportunity to be heard, and 
representing to the trial court otherwise, and then persisting in the action knowing it had 
failed to serve process on Eaglebrook. PacifiCorp must have known that it did not serve 
process on Eaglebrook when it obtained the Preliminary Injunction. Such process is 
fundamental to a lawsuit. Either you serve process or you fail to serve process. PacifiCorp 
was given adequate time to verify whether service was effectuated. 
However, even if PacifiCorp did not really know it failed to serve process on 
Eaglebrook at the time it obtained the Preliminary Injunction, then PacifiCorp became aware 
of its failure when Eaglebrook filed its first pleading. R. at 45-47. From that initial pleading, 
and throughout the lawsuit, Eaglebrook raised the fact that PacifiCorp had failed to serve 
Eaglebrook with process and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. R. at passim. 
PacifiCorp never denied the fact that Eaglebrook never received service of process. 
PacifiCorp professed that they "weren't even aware" that PacifiCorp completely failed to 
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serve process on Eaglebrook. R. at 307. 
Notwithstanding being fully aware and representing to the court and opposing counsel 
that it failed to serve Eaglebrook with process, PacifiCorp persisted in asserting a cause of 
action that was without merit. As a result of PacifiCorp's bad faith persistence, Eaglebrook 
was forced to defend itself to the best of their ability, and incurred attorney fees and costs. 
Again, PacifiCorp never denied the fact that Eaglebrook never received service of 
process. In fact, PacifiCorp's own counsel admitted that "unbeknownst to counsel, the 
Complaint had not been served upon [Eaglebrook] prior to the hearing on [PacifiCorp's] 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction." R. at 69. "We weren't even aware that the defendants 
had not been served until after the expiration of the 120 days." R. at 307. 
At the Hearing on April 27, 2006, PacifiCorp's counsel apologized to the trial court 
and counsel: 
The last time we were down here a year ago arguing this preliminary 
injunction Mr. Tolman was not represented. It was a result of a mix up in our 
St. George office to get Mr. Tolman served. I apologize to the Court for not 
having caught that, and I apologize to Mr. Tolman as well. 
R. at 305. 
The record that has already been referenced speaks loudly of PacifiCorp's bad faith 
in this case. However, one more experience in dealing with PacifiCorp in this action deserves 
special attention because it demonstrates the fabian policy employed by PacifiCorp. After the 
November 16, 2006 hearing, PacifiCorp complained that "[d]ue to a series of apparent 
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miscommunications ... PacifiCorp did not have the opportunity to be heard at that hearing." 
R. at 178. PacifiCorp's counsel stated that he was ill during the week of the November 16, 
2006 hearing, and that on November 15, 2006, he personally contacted the trial court's 
scheduling clerk "to advise her of his illness and to ask that the hearing be continued." R. at 
182. PacifiCorp's counsel stated that the trial court clerk "advised him that the matter would 
be stricken from the calendar." Id. PacifiCorp's counsel asked the trial court clerk "what he 
needed to do so that the hearing would be continued" and he was advised that "he should 
contact opposing counsel." Id. PacifiCorp's counsel represented that the trial court clerk "did 
not tell Mr. Rampton that he should file a motion to continue or that he should have another 
attorney from his office appear." R. at 183. PacifiCorp's counsel then represented that he did 
contact opposing counsel "that same day and advised them that the hearing would be 
continued." Id. 
The truth is that PacifiCorp did have notice and an opportunity to be heard at the 
November 16, 2006 hearing and any "miscommunications" about that hearing being 
continued were a result of PacifiCorp's counsel's actions or inaction. See R. at 243-244. 
Counsel for Eaglebrook learned that counsel for PacifiCorp told the trial court's clerk that 
there was an agreement between counsel to continue the matter and that Eaglebrook's 
counsel would appear at the hearing on November 16, 2006 to request a continuance. R. at 
243. No such agreement existed between counsel for the parties. Id. In addition, counsel for 
PacifiCorp represented to counsel for Eaglebrook that the court had taken the matter off 
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calendar, when in fact, the court had not taken the matter off calendar. R. at 243-245. 
Eaglebrook's counsel never agreed to a continuance prior to and regarding the November 16, 
2006 hearing. Id It was only by chance that Eaglebrook's counsel learned of the "apparent 
miscommunication" and barely made an appearance at the hearing. R. at 244. 
As a result of PacifiCorp's counsel's fabian actions and inaction, Eaglebrook's rights 
were prejudiced, again, in that Eaglebrook's counsel was not adequately prepared to appear 
at the November 16,2006 hearing, even though Eaglebrook' s counsel did appear and the trial 
court did order the case dismissed at that time. R. at 244. At the November 16,2006 hearing, 
the trial court judge stated the following: 
The record should reflect that today is the time set for these motions, that Mr. 
Rampton, although the indication is that he is ill, the record should reflect that 
Mr. Rampton is involved as a partner in a very large firm out of Salt Lake City, 
also has an office here in St. George. The matter has not been continued. Mr. 
Rampton is not present. 
R. at 306. In addition, Eaglebrook's counsel represented to the trial court that if PacifiCorp's 
counsel had sent a representative to the court that Eaglebrook's counsel "would have been 
more than happy to continue this under any circumstance." Id. In reply, the trial court judge 
stated the following: 
Counsel, that's what's a little troubling to the court. They should have had 
some representative here. They should have called ahead of time. The court did 
not take the matter off the calendar. 
R. at 306. 
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In its final Order dismissing the action, the trial court found that "as [PacifiCorp] did 
not take the simple step of withdrawing this case, but persisted in advancing an improperly 
formed case against good reason, and as [PacifiCorp] has unnecessarily used the Court's time 
and caused [Eaglebrook] to defend in a void of pleadings and proper procedure, an award of 
attorney fees and costs is proper." R. at 280. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
PacifiCorp asserted the lawsuit with a good faith belief in its claims, once Eaglebrook filed 
its initial pleading, PacifiCorp could no longer have held a good faith belief that its 
improperly formed action could be asserted in good faith. 
In the State of Utah, if a party fails to serve process on the opposing party, then Rule 
4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that the action shall be dismissed 
without prejudice. The only exception to serving outside the 120 day time limit is found in 
the rule itself, wherein it states that "the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall 
be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a 
longer periodof time for goodcause shown"" Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(i) (emphasis added). Here, 
PacifiCorp never asked the court to allow service of the summons and complaint beyond the 
120 days and never showed any good cause why service was never effectuated. 
Rule 65A(a)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "No preliminary 
injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party." There is no exception to this 
rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A. However, the Preliminary Injunction was issued without notice 
to Eaglebrook, and Eaglebrook can only assume that PacifiCorp represented to the court that 
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notice was given. Otherwise, it is not known how the court could issue such an injunction 
without adhering to the basic rules of notice and opportunity to be heard as dictated by Rule 
65 A, the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution, when life, liberty, or property 
is in jeopardy. 
Formal service of process is a "bedrock principle" of our nation's legal system: "An 
individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified 
of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process." Murphy Bros., Inc. 
V. MichettiPipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, f 11 (1999). Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." The companion due process clause in the United States Constitution is found 
in the Fifth Amendment, which states, "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law[.]" In regards to service of process, the United States 
Supreme Court has held: 
Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of 
justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant. At 
common law, the writ of capias ad respondendum directed the sheriff to secure 
the defendant's appearance by taking him into custody. The requirement that 
a defendant be brought into litigation by official service is the contemporary 
counterpart to that writ. 
In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the 
defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the 
complaint names as defendant. Accordingly, one becomes a party officially, 
and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons 
or other authority asserting measure stating the time within which the party 
served must appear and defend. Unless a named defendant agrees to waive 
service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an 
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individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or 
substantive rights. 
Murphy Bros., Inc V. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999)(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). Utah case law, statutes and rules agree with the Utah Constitution 
and United States Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court stated the following with respect 
to service of process: 
[D]ue process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Instead, due process is flexible and, being 
based on the concept of fairness, should afford the procedural protections that 
the given situation demands. The minimum requirements are adequate notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. To be considered a 
meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should be heard by an 
impartial decision maker. In addition, a record is helpful to allow for judicial 
review, though where not available or complete, the reviewing court must be 
allowed to determine the facts to ensure due process was given. 
Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 593 (Utah 2000) (quotations and 
citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
At the very least, Eaglebrook should have been given adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. PacifiCorp represented that it was unaware 
of its fundamental failure to serve process on Eaglebrook. R. at 307. Eaglebrook was not 
given notice or the opportunity to be heard as required by due process standards. Also, 
Eaglebrook did not waive its right to notice and the opportunity to be heard. 
Taken in isolation, such a basic and fundamental failure to serve process on an 
opposing party may be curable and excusable under certain circumstances, however, in this 
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case, after 120 days had passed, given PacifiCorp's fabian policy before and during the 
action, PacifiCorp's failure to serve process and persistence in pursuing a fatally flawed 
action against Eaglebrook, in the face of clear binding legal authority, is nothing more than 
a manifestation of bad faith. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has instructed us on how to determine whether or not a 
party has acted in bad faith: 
To find that a party acted in 'bad faith', the trial court must find that one or 
more of the following factors existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with 
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud 
others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 306, 316 (Utah 1998)(referencing Cady v. Johnson, 61 \ 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). As explained above, the trial court in this case found that 
PacifiCorp "proceeded to litigate the case as if service had been rendered within the 120 
days, which it had not." R. at 279. After Eaglebrook's initial pleading, PacifiCorp knew it 
failed to serve process on Eaglebrook and admitted the same when it stipulated to vacate the 
Order for the Preliminary Injunction. R. at 69. Again, as a result of PacifiCorp's knowing 
failure to serve process on Eaglebrook, and persistence in light of that knowing failure, the 
trial court found that an award of attorney fees and costs was proper. R. at 280. 
The findings by the trial court illustrate the court's conviction that PacifiCorp lacked 
an honest belief in the propriety of their litigation activities, that PacifiCorp intended to take 
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unconscionable advantage of Eaglebrook, and that PacifiCorp acted with the knowledge that 
its activities would hinder, delay, or defraud Eaglebrook in the litigation. See R. at 277-281. 
As was found in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, the trial court specifically found that one or more 
of the Cady factors existed and was not required to expressly use the magic words "bad faith" 
in determining the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. See 961 P.2d at 316. 
With respect to the trial court not using the magic words "bad faith", the Valcarce 
court stated that even though "it would be better practice for trial judges to list the specific 
statutory elements" required under section 78-27-56, the Supreme Court of Utah adheres to 
the following assumption: 
[I]n cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the 
trial court but no findings . . . appear in the record, we "assume that the trier 
of facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if 
from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it. 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991), cert 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, the appellate court will "uphold the trial court 
even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume 
that the court actually made such findings." Id. at 316 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788, n. 
6). In addition, the Valcarce court stated that the "question is whether there is evidence from 
which the trial court could reasonably have entered a finding of bad faith." Id. 
The trial court's findings give plenty of room to reasonably assume that the trial court 
actually made a finding of bad faith on the part of PacifiCorp, and that PacifiCorp's action 
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was meritless once it knew its action was improperly formed and that it could have simply 
withdrawn the matter and re-filed the action. See R. at 280. Instead, PacifiCorp persisted, in 
bad faith, in a non-meritorious action. As a result, the trial court found that an award of 
attorney fees and costs was proper. See R. at 280. 
In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by statute or by contract. 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 348 (Utah 2005). In this case, the trial court found that "an 
award of attorney fees and costs is proper." R. at 280. The only possibility for finding that 
attorney fees and costs were proper is if the trial court found attorney fees were authorized 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, as attorney fees were not pursued under contract. 
It is important to note that once faced with the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
PacifiCorp did file a new action, but still refused to voluntarily dismiss the old action, R. at 
307, choosing instead to continue to pursue the matter and then to appeal the matter once it 
was dismissed. 
The following findings by the trial court are sufficiently specific in referring to the 
issue of bad faith: PacifiCorp should have withdrawn the action at the initial phases of the 
trial after learning of its failure to properly and timely serve the Summons and Complaint; 
PacifiCorp did not take the simple step of withdrawing the action, but persisted in advancing 
an improperly formed case "against good reason"; PacifiCorp "unnecessarily used the 
Court's time and caused [Eaglebrook] to defend in a void of pleadings and proper 
procedure"; and "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." R. at 280. Therefore, the 
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trial court should have awarded reasonable attorney fees along with the costs that were 
awarded. 
C. The Trial Court's Non-Award of Attorney Fees is Patent Error or 
a Clear Abuse of Discretion 
"The award of attorney fees is a matter of law, which we review for correctness." 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 348 (Utah 2005)(referencing Paul DeGroot Bldg. Servs., 
L.L.C v. Gallacher, 112 P.3d 490 (Utah 2005)). "[A] trial court has 'broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination 
against an abuse-of-discretion standard."' Id. at 348 (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)). "[T]he trial court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted 
by one party in determining a reasonable fee." Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
In this case, the trial court found that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." 
R. at 280. However, even though it found that attorney fees and costs were proper, the trial 
court only awarded $427.97 in costs and $0.00 in attorney fees. R. at 281. By the time the 
trial court entered its order awarding the $427.97 in costs and $0.00 in attorney fees, 
Eaglebrook had requested a total of Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred and Eight Dollars and 
no Cents ($18,608.00) for attorney fees, and had submitted two affidavits of counsel in 
support of the request for those attorney fees, wherein the fees were detailed by affidavits and 
the attached invoices and could have been reviewed by the trial court judge. R. at 198-219, 
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and 268-272. 
The non-award of attorney fees was patent error or a clear abuse-of-discretion given 
the fact that the trial court found that PacifiCorp's action was meritless and brought or 
asserted in bad faith and given the fact that the trial court found that an award of attorney fees 
and costs was proper. R. at 280. An award of attorney fees would have been "proper" only 
if the action was meritless and not asserted in good faith, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56. 
More specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) states that the court "shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]" 
(emphasis added). However, in this case, even though the court found that an award of 
attorney fees and costs was proper, and even though Eaglebrook was the prevailing party, the 
court only awarded costs and did not award any attorney fees to Eaglebrook. R. at 281. 
There is provision in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2) for the court to not award 
attorney fees: 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before 
the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
(emphasis added). In this case, the trial court made no findings with respect to any affidavit 
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of impecuniosity, nor did the trial court enter in the record any reason for not awarding 
attorney fees under § 78-27-56(1), as is required under § 78-27-56 in order to award no fees 
after having found that fees were proper. 
In other words, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 makes an award of attorney fees 
mandatory if the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, unless 
the court specifically finds the party filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action or the 
court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. As explained above, the trial court 
made no finding with respect to any affidavit of impecuniosity, and further, the court did not 
enter in the record the reason why it did not award fees to Eaglebrook. 
Eaglebrook was entitled to the full amount of those attorney fees unnecessarily 
expended as a result of PacifiCorp's meritless action and PacifiCorp's bad faith pursuit of 
its action. Eaglebrook provided the trial court with adequate evidence from which to 
determine the amount and reasonableness of those fees, and PacifiCorp raised no specific 
objections to any fees or costs and should not be allowed to raise those objections for the first 
time on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following with respect to an award of fees that 
is less than what the trial court found to be reasonable: 
[I] f reasonable fees are recoverable by contract or statute and the trial court 
considers all pertinent factors and determines in the exercise of its sound 
discretion that a specific sum is a reasonable fee, it is a mistake of law to 
award less than that amount. Stated another way, the trial court has broad 
discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will 
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consider that determination against an abuse of discretion standard. However, 
once the trial court makes thai determination in the exercise of its sound 
discretion, it commits legal error if it awards less than the reasonable fee to 
which the successful litigant is entitled. 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991 (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court found that 
an award of attorney fees and costs was "proper." R. at 280. However, for an unknown 
reason, the court did not award any fees, it only awarded costs, even though the court found 
that PacifiCorp persisted in advancing an improperly formed action against good reason and 
unnecessarily wasted the court's time and forced Eaglebrook to defend in a vacuum of 
pleadings and proper procedure. R. at 280. The result is that the court committed patent error 
or abused its discretion by awarding less than a reasonable fee to which Eaglebrook was 
entitled. 
The trial court did not award attorney's fees even for Eaglebrook's counsel's having 
to object to the improperly obtained Preliminary Injunction; or for the Motion for 
Dismissal/Summary Judgment and the November 11, 2006 hearing which was not attended 
by PacifiCorp's counsel; or for PacifiCorp's objection to the November 11, 2006 order, 
which objection was not recognized by the court, but only caused additional delay and 
expense. Though PacifiCorp may argue that some of the activity conducted by counsel in this 
action may be duplicative of work that may be necessary in the new case, it would be 
improper for the court to consider what work in another case may or may not be necessary. 
The point is, that in this case, none of the work was necessary, as the case was not properly 
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formed in the beginning and was improperly advanced. Any benefit to Eaglebrook for legal 
work conducted in the earlier case will be minimal at best, as much time has now passed and 
counsel will need to refresh itself again in the new matter. 
Therefore, the trial court committed patent error or abused its discretion by failing to 
award attorney's fees to Eaglebrook in light of PacifiCorp's bad faith pursuit of a meritless 
action. 
D. Eaglebrook's Attorney's Fees Were Reasonable 
"[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable 
fee, and [appellate courts] will consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion 
standard." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). Eaglebrook 
requested a total of Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred and Eight Dollars and no Cents 
($18,608.00) for attorney fees and submitted two affidavits of counsel in support of the 
request for those fees, which fees were detailed by the affidavits and attached invoices. R. 
at 198-219, and 268-272. Such fees may have been deemed unreasonable, in the sense that 
no fees should have been incurred by Eaglebrook in this case. However, Eaglebrook was 
forced to defend itself and unwind what PacifiCorp had done throughout the entire process, 
from the improperly notice Preliminary Injunction through the Objection to the Order 
Dismissing the action that came after Plaintiffs failure to attend the prior dispositive motion 
hearing date. 
The court should consider that despite never being served with the Summons and 
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Complaint or the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Eaglebrook was put into the position 
of having to defend on the Motion. At the April 27, 2006 hearing to set aside the preliminary 
injunction, as an example, it was entirely unclear what the court was hearing. In considering 
all possibilities, Eaglebrook had to prepare for an evidentiary hearing, but believed the court 
would address its objections to the Preliminary Injunction, specifically addressing the lack 
of service Eaglebrook raised in its pleadings. Instead, the court took evidence, which 
Eaglebrook had prepared for, but had yet to be served with the motion for preliminary 
injunction by PacifiCorp. Such confusion was created by PacifiCorp's failure to properly 
form the case. Therefore, Eaglebrook had to essentially prepare for any and all possible court 
proceedings, not just the April 27, 2006 hearing, at a great expense to Eaglebrook. 
At the November 16,2006 hearing, the court asked Eaglebrook's counsel, "[I]f you'll 
go ahead and prepare an order for the court, the court will go ahead and take a look at the 
attorney fees. And I'll go ahead and make a ruling with respect to that." R. at 306. 
Eaglebrook's counsel clarified that it would be submitting attorney's fees and costs in camera 
for the court to review, R. at 306, and Eaglebrook's counsel did submit an Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Request for Fees and Costs. R. at 198. Attached to the affidavit were 
all of the fee invoices and billing memoranda produced in this case up to that point in the 
litigation. Id. The invoices and billing memoranda contained detailed descriptions of each 
task performed by the attorneys in this case and each cost incurred. Id. Eaglebrook's counsel 
also submitted a request for additional attorney fees for having to conduct additional legal 
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research and for preparing the response to PacifiCorp's Objections to Order on Eaglebrook's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 251. 
PacifiCorp failed to complain or identify to the trial court any particular issues or time 
that should not be awarded. Notwithstanding PacifiCorp's silence with respect to attorney 
fees, the trial court still did not award attorney fees even though it did find that attorney fees 
and costs should be awarded. R. at 280-281. At the end of the hearing on February 12, 2007, 
the trial court stated, "I've a pretty good idea how I am going to rule. However, there are 
issue of attorney's fees and the, also the whole, well, the whole issue with respect to 
jurisdiction and whether or not proper form was followed in this case." R. at 307. 
Again, Eaglebrook submitted several affidavits with detailed billing invoices, which 
were to be reviewed by the trial court judge. R. at 198-219, and 268-272. Either the judge 
reviewed the billing statements and affidavits and concluded that all the fees were 
unreasonable, or the judge did not review the billing statements and affidavits and simply 
concluded that no fees were to be awarded. 
Defendant asserts that all fees submitted to the trial court were unnecessary as a result 
of PacifiCorp's persistence in pursuing an improperly formed action "against good reason". 
However, the trial court committed patent error or abused its discretion by making 
Eaglebrook suffer the consequences of PacifiCorp's improper behavior and its bad faith 
pursuit of that action, and therefore, fees must be awarded by the Court of Appeals. 
/// 
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II. Eaglebrook is Entitled to Recover Their Attorney's Fees 
Incurred On Appeal 
'This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees 
on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P. 2d 305, 
319 (Utah 1998)(quoting Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996)). As a 
result of PacifiCorp's frivolous appeal, Eaglebrook is entitled to recover their costs and 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal. According to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, if the court determines that an appeal "is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party." In addition, Rule 33(a) states, "The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney." 
Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the definition of a 
frivolous appeal: 
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one 
interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase 
in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
In Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052,1060 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court found 
that "Plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of the attorney defendants was not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, nor based in good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
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existing law," The reasoning behind the Sanders findings was that the Plaintiffs brief in that 
case offered only a general conclusory statement about the applicable issue and cited only 
two cases as authority. Id. The case law cited by the Plaintiff in that case was not helpful to 
the court in resolving the issues appealed against the attorney defendants. Id. The Plaintiff 
offered no authority or argument that resolved the issues before the court. Id. Moreover, 
when the Plaintiff in that case was invited to articulate at least a theory or an argument, the 
Plaintiffs counsel was unable to do so. Id. "In short, plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of the 
attorney defendants was a waste of time and resources of all concerned." Id. 
As in Sanders, PacifiCorp's appeal of the dismissal of PacifiCorp's action, without 
prejudice, was not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, nor based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. PacifiCorp simply would not be able to 
overcome the service of process requirement found in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Alone, this would justify the award of fees, but PacifiCorp's abuse of the system 
of procedure has continued throughout even this appeal. 
PacifiCorp filed its notice of appeal on April 30, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, PacifiCorp's docketing statement was due within twenty-
one (21) days after it filed its notice of appeal. PacifiCorp did not file its docketing statement 
until June 6, 2007, which was thirty-seven (37) days after it filed its notice of appeal. 
PacifiCorp's brief was to be served within forty (40) days after the appellate court 
clerk gave notice that the index was transmitted from the trial court, which was initially set 
37 
for August 21, 2007. See Utah R. App. P. 26(a). On August 20, 2007, PacifiCorp filed an Ex 
Parte Motion for Extension of Time to file its brief. In its request for an enlargement of the 
time in which to tile its brief, PacifiCorp cited Rule 22(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for authority to make the request. PacifiCorp stated that no enlargement of time 
was previously granted and that the time had not already expired for the filing of its brief. In 
addition, PacifiCorp stated, 'This motion otherwise complies with the requirements and 
limitations of Paragraph (b) of Rule 22, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." See the Ex 
Parte Motion for Extension of Time, on file herein. 
The problem with PacifiCorp's ex parte motion to extend the time to file its brief is 
that PacifiCorp did not comply with Rule 22 or Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. First of all, Rule 22(b)(1) states, "Motions for an enlargement of time for filing 
briefs beyond the time permitted by stipulation of the parties under Rule 26(a) are not 
favored. Utah R. App. P. 22(b)(1) (emphasis added). With respect to stipulating to an 
enlargement of time, Rule 26(a) states, "By stipulation filed with the court in accordance with 
Rule 21(a), the parties may extend each of such periods for no more than 30 days." Utah R. 
App. P. 26(a) (emphasis added). "No such stipulation shall be effective unless it is filed prior 
to the expiration of the period sought to be extended." Utah App. R. P. 26(a). Most 
importantly, Rule 22(c) states the following: 
Except as to enlargements oftime for filing and service of briefs under Rule 
26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for enlargement of time not to 
exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been previously granted, if the 
time has not already expired for doing the act for which the enlargement is 
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sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with the requirements and 
limitations of paragraph (b) of this rule. 
Utah R. App. P. 22(c) (emphasis added). The language is clear in Rule 22(c), where it states, 
"Except as to enlargements of time for filing and service of briefs under Rule 26(a)..." This 
obviously means that a party may not file an ex parte motion for enlargement of time when 
the enlargement of time is for the filing and service of briefs. 
Notwithstanding the clear language of Utah Appellate Rule 22(c), PacifiCorp, or its 
counsel, did not comply with Rule 22(c) and filed an ex parte motion for enlargement of the 
time for the filing and service of its brief. In its ex parte motion for enlargement of time, 
PacifiCorp stated that it was requesting the enlargement pursuant to Rule 22(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See the Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time, on file herein. 
At this point, words cannot describe the amazement that Eaglebrook's counsel has 
experienced in dealing with PacifiCorp throughout this matter. At every turn, PacifiCorp has 
made up its own rules of procedure and it seems it has been given a pass at every turn as 
well. Now, Eaglebrook is here on appeal, because of PacifiCorp's failure to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and now, on appeal, PacifiCorp has failed to comply with the 
Utah Appellate Rules of Procedure. Even though the failure to comply with Rule 22(c) of the 
Utah Appellate Rules of Procedure may not be a crucial failure to PacifiCorp's appeal, the 
cumulative effect of PacifiCorp's fabian policy in carrying out the instant litigation is beyond 
the pale and must be addressed by this court. 
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Eaglebrook did not oppose the ex parte motion to enlarge the time for PacifiCorp to 
file its brief. Eaglebrook wanted to see PacifiCorp's brief. PacifiCorp was given until 
September 4, 2007 to file its brief. However, September 4, 2007 came and went without any 
brief being filed by PacifiCorp. Moreover, on September 17, 2007, this Court filed an Order 
of Dismissal, on file herein, wherein this Court stated the following: 
For failure of Appellant to file the Appellant's brief within the time permitted 
by Utah R. App. P. 26(a), which time expired on September 4, 2007, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, see Utah R. App. P. 3(a); 
provided, however, that if the Appellant's brief is submitted within ten (10) 
days from the date hereof, the appeal shall be thereby reinstated without 
further order of the court. 
Even though PacifiCorp was given an additional ten days beyond the extended time 
period for filing its brief, PacifiCorp never filed its brief, and, as a result, PacifiCorp's appeal 
was dismissed. One can only wonder why PacifiCorp did not file its brief. PacifiCorp's 
counsel is a partner at one of the largest law firms in the state of Utah. There is no excuse for 
not filing and serving a brief when you are the party that filed the appeal and conducted the 
appeal up to the point of asking for an extension of time to file a brief. 
Even though PacifiCorp tried to argue that Eaglebrook had waived service, 
Eaglebrook was successful in obtaining a dismissal of PacifiCorp's action below as 
PacifiCorp failed to serve process in a timely manner. Even though it knew it failed to serve 
process and that its action was meritless, PacifiCorp pushed ahead and pursued its action in 
bad faith. PacifiCorp's appeal has clearly been imposed for the same purposes as below and 
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for the added purpose of delaying the inevitable. However, once it came time to actually file 
a brief, PacifiCorp seems to have quietly backed away. The silence is stunning and only 
proves that its appeal was without merit and therefore frivolous. Therefore, this Court should 
exercise its discretion and award Eaglebrook their attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that an award of attorney fees and costs was proper in 
dismissing PacifiCorp's action. However, the trial court committed patent error or abused its 
discretion by not awarding attorney fees to Eaglebrook pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56, as PacifiCorp's action was meritless and asserted in bad faith. As a result, that part of the 
Order of the trial court that did not award fees should be reversed and Eaglebrook's 
reasonable attorney fees should be awarded. 
This Court properly dismissed PacifiCorp's appeal. PacifiCorp's appeal was not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. It is highly unlikely that this Court would overturn 
the due process requirements of Rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, 
PacifiCorp's appeal has clearly been imposed for the same purposes as below and for the 
added purpose of delaying the inevitable. Therefore, this Court should exercise its discretion 
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